THE MISCHIEF OF THE STRICT LIABILITY
LABEL IN THE LAW OF WARNINGS
Myron J. Bromberg*
Although the introduction of strict liability in tort under section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts for inherent product
defects represented an important step in the progress of products liability law, the lack of clarity in the comments to that section have operated to confuse and distort the law in regard to a
seller's duty to warn of the dangerous propensities of the product as well as the seller's duty to instruct as to use. The comments have misled courts into creating a cause of action for
"strict liability for failure to warn" which has become a dragon.
This article proposes slaying the dragon.
A seller of a product has a common law duty to warn of the
product's "latent limitations" and propensities which are not
open, obvious or known to the user.' The negligent failure to
warn creates liability despite the fact that the product itself is not
defective. 2 The drafters of the Restatement (Second) of Torts recognized this negligence-based liability for failure to warn in section
388, which provides:
One who supplies directly or through a third person a chattel
for another to use is subject to liability to those whom the supplier should expect to use the chattel with the consent of the
other or to be endangered by its probable use, for physical
harm caused by the use of the chattel in the manner for which
and by a person for whose use it is supplied, if the supplier
(a) knows or has reason to know that the chattel is or is likely
to be dangerous for the use for which it is supplied, and
(b) has no reason to believe that those for whose use the chattel is supplied will realize its dangerous condition, and
(c) fails to exercise reasonable care to inform them of its dangerous condition or to the facts which make it likely to be
dangerous.3
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I Martin v. Bengue, Inc., 25 N.J. 359, 367, 136 A.2d 626, 630 (1957) (quoting
Tomao v. A.P. De Sanno & Son, 209 F.2d 544, 546 (3d Cir. 1954)).
2 Id. at 366-67, 136 A.2d at 629-30.
3 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 388 (1965).
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Section 402A, which created strict liability for defective products, however, made no special provision for products which are
"unavoidably unsafe," such as liquor, cigarettes or even products of
greater social utility, such as prescription drugs. 4 Thus, the black
letter rule of section 402A was patently unacceptable without modification for it would have created absolute liability for every danger
of every product.5 Oddly, the needed modification was made not in
the body of the Restatement, but rather in a comment. The section
402A "comments" have been treated not merely as explanations or
clarifications of the section, as other Restatement comments, but have
actually been construed as creating new failure to warn liability as
well as exceptions to the "restated" law. The comments are accepted as so integral to the black letter rule of section 402A that
they are commonly treated as part of that rule.6
Three comments to section 402A deal with warnings. Comment h states that when a seller has reason to anticipate a misuse of
the product, the product is "defective" if it is sold without warning
of the danger of misuse. This is indeed the common law rule of
Martin v. Bengue, Inc.,7 a 1957 New Jersey decision, although the
term "defective" as used in Martin was the equivalent of "negligently sold." The comment was obviously not intended to add anything to section 388.8 Likewise, commentj provides that a product
may be "unreasonably dangerous," 9 and thus "defective" if it lacks
directions and warnings. The test set forth is couched in terms of
reasonable conduct, skill, and foresight. This comment likewise added nothing to section 388. Comment k deals with unavoidably unsafe products which may carry a high degree of risk but are
"apparently useful and desirable product[sl."'
Such products are
not defective under comment k. However, they must be "accompaId. at § 402A.
5 Risk-utility balancing had not yet been conceived.
4

6 South Carolina has made the comments to § 402A the "legislative history" of
that section, which has been adopted as the law in that state. S.C. CODE ANN. § 1573-30 (Law Co-op. 1976).
7 25 N.J. 359, 136 A.2d 626 (1957).
8 See Knitz v. Minster Mach. Co., 69 Ohio St. 2d 460, 466 n.5, 432 N.E.2d 814,
818 n.5 (1982) (failure to warn does not give rise to action in strict liability);
Hardiman v. Zep Mfg. Co., 14 Ohio App. 3d 222, 228, 470 N.E.2d 941, 944 (1984)

("Ohio does not recognize a strict liability cause of action arising from allegations
of inadequate warning.").
9 The "unreasonably dangerous" language has been replaced with "unsafe" in
both California and New Jersey. Cronin v.J.B.E. Olson Corp., 8 Cal.3d 121, 501
P.2d 1153, 104 Cal. Rptr. 443 (1972); Suter v. San Angelo Foundry & Mach. Co.,
81 N.J. 150, 406 A.2d 140 (1979).
10 RESTATEMENT, supra note 3, at § 402A comment k.
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nied by proper directions and warning[sl."' ' Thus, although comment k did exempt certain products from the strict liability rule of
section 402A, l2 it retained negligence liability for failure to warn of
product dangers. 3 Courts soon misinterpreted this retention of liability as creating a new liability.' 4 The waters of warning were
frightfully muddled."

If failure to warn can indeed render a product defective under
Restatement section 402A(1), that product would appear to be subject
to section 402A(2), which indicates that the strict liability rule applies to the product "although the seller has exercised all possible
care in the... sale of his product.

16

Subsection (2) of section

402A, however, makes no sense when applied to a product charged
with being "defective" for failure to warn. That subsection provides
that the product is defective despite "all possible care in the . . .
sale."" 7 Thus, a product whose warnings were drawn with "all possible care" could be defective for failure to warn, if the subsection
applied.
Courts which insist upon maintaining a distinction between
strict liability failure to warn and negligent failure to warn have justified the dichotomy based upon the following alleged distinctions:
1. Under strict liability principles, it is unnecessary for a
plaintiff to show that the seller knew or had reason to know
that the product had a dangerous "trait. ' 18
2. In strict liability warning cases, the defendant rather than
the plaintiff has the burden of proving that information conld.
The exempted products are "incapable of being made safe for their intended
and ordinary use," and include drugs. See id.
'I

12

13
14

Id.

See, e.g., Basko v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 416 F.2d 417, 426 (2d Cir. 1969)
("[t]here is no strict liability under comment k unless the consumer first establishes
a breach of the manufacturer's duty to warn."); Sterling Drug, Inc. v. Yarrow, 408
F.2d 978, 992 (8th Cir. 1969) (standard of liability is "breach of the duty to give a
proper (reasonable under the circumstances) warning..."); Seley v. G.D. Searle &
Co., 67 Ohio St. 2d 192, 197, 423 N.E.2d 831, 836 (1981). (if inadequate warning,
"the drug may be considered 'defective' and unreasonably dangerous, thereby subjecting the manufacturer to strict liability for resulting injuries.") (emphasis in
original).
15 The Supreme Court of Oregon first held that there was no difference between
negligence and strict liability failure to warn in Anderson v. Klix Chem. Co., Inc.,
256 Or. 199, 472 P.2d 806 (1970), but subsequently decided there was a difference,
Phillips v. Kimwood Mach. Co., 269 Or. 485, 525 P.2d 1033 (1974) (en banc).
16 RESTATEMENT, supra note 3, at § 402A(2).
17 Id.
18 Michalko v. Cooke Color & Chem. Corp., 91 N.J. 386, 394-95, 451 A.2d 179,
183 (1982); Freund v. Cellofilm Properties, Inc., 87 N.J. 229, 242-43, 432 A.2d 925,
932 (1981).
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cerning the danger was not reasonably available or obtainable,
and that it therefore lacked actual or constructive knowledge
of the defect.' 9
3. In strict liability cases, the duty to provide an adequate
warning attaches without regard to prevailing industry
20
standards.
4. The test for strict liability is whether the product is "reasonably safe."- 2' It is not reasonably safe 22"if the same product
could have been marketed more safely."
5. In strict liability cases, knowledge of the risk that employers may not adequately warn their employees is imputed to the
defendants.23
6. Evidence of subsequent warnings is admissible in a strict
liability case. The repair doctrine does not apply24to strict liability actions since fault is considered irrelevant.
7. In strict liability cases involving failure to warn, warnings
must cover "all foreseeable uses." This is a different test of
foreseeability from the one involved 2in
the concept of proxi5
mate cause under negligence theory.
8. The product can present a degree of dangerousness, because of its lack of warning, which the law of strict liability will
not tolerate, even though the actions of the seller were entirely
reasonable in selling the article without a warning-considering2 6 what he knew or should have known at the time he sold
it.

9. There is7 a strict liability duty to warn although the danger
2
is obvious.
19 Feldman v. Lederle Laboratories, 97 NJ. 429, 455-56, 479 A.2d 374, 388
(1984).
20

Freund v. Cellofilm Properties, Inc., 87 N.J. 229, 242-43, 432 A.2d 925, 932

(1981).

21 Michalko v. Cooke Color & Chem. Corp., 91 N.J. 386,402,451 A.2d 179, 187
(1982); Beshada v. Johns-Manville Prod. Corp., 90 N.J. 193, 201, 447 A.2d 539,
544-45 (1982); Freund v. Cellofilm Properties, Inc., 87 N.J. 229, 242, 432 A.2d 925,
931-32 (1981).
22 Beshada v. Johns-Manville Prod. Corp., 90 N.J. 193, 201, 447 A.2d 539, 545

(1982).
23

Whitehead v. St. Joe Lead Co., Inc., 729 F.2d 238, 246-47 (3d Cir. 1984);

Olencki v. Mead Chem. Co., 209 NJ. Super. 456, 463, 507 A.2d 803, 806 (Law Div.
1986).
24 Ault v. International Harvester Co., 13 Cal. 3d 113, 118-20, 528 P.2d 1148,
1150-52, 117 Cal. Rptr. 812, 814-16 (1974) (en banc).
25

Smith v. United States Gypsum Co., 612 P.2d 251, 254 (Okla. 1980).

Beshada v. Johns-Manville Prod. Corp., 90 N.J. 193, 204, 447 A.2d 539, 546
(1982); Phillips v. Kimwood Mach. Co., 269 Or. 485, 495-96, 525 P.2d 1033, 1038
(1974) (en banc).
26

27

See Campos v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 98 N.J. 198, 207, 485 A.2d 305,

309-10 (1984).
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Each of the above is incorrect or is a "distinction without a
difference."28
NECESSITY OF PROVING

A

DANGEROUS "TRAIT"

Although courts had suggested that the reason for preserving a separate strict liability cause of action for failure to warn
was the lack of necessity of proving the product's "dangerous
3 0 vitrait," '29 the New Jersey case of Feldman v. Lederle Laboratories
tiated this reasoning when it held that, in fact, failure to warn
strict liability required a finding that the manufacturer knew or
should have known of the product danger.
EVIDENTIARY DISTINCTIONS

The distinctions appearing in items 2, 3 and 5 above involve
what are suggested to be evidentiary distinctions between strict
liability and negligent failure to warn theories. The Feldman case
suggests a presumption that the manufacturer knew or should
have known of the danger, so that the "burden of proof" shifts to
the manufacturer. Without considering whether that presumption is well founded, it is no more appropriate to strict liability
than to negligence. If, indeed, the burden should shift, it should
shift for both negligence and strict liability claims. If prevailing
industry standards are irrelevant as to whether a warning is adequate in strict liability, such standards should likewise be irrelevant in negligent failure to warn. Likewise, if such standards
constitute some evidence, but not conclusive evidence of an adeapply equally in both
quate warning, then that principle should
3'
cases.
negligence
and
strict liability
ADMISSIBILITY OF SUBSEQUENT WARNINGS

Subsequent warnings are generally inadmissible to prove a
negligent failure to warn.3 2 However, in Ault v. InternationalHarH. FIELDING, THE HISTORY OF TOM JONES, ch. 13 (1749).
29 See, e.g., Michalko v. Cooke Color & Chem. Corp., 91 N.J. 386, 451 A.2d 179
(1982); Freund v. Cellofilm Properties, Inc., 87 N.J. 229, 432 A.2d 925 (1981).
30 97 N.J. 429, 479 A.2d 374 (1984).
31 The Third Circuit Court of Appeals in Whitehead v. St. Joe Lead Co., Inc., 729
F.2d 238 (3d Cir. 1984) suggested that the supplier of a product to an employer is
irrebuttably presumed to know that the employer may not adequately warn his em28

ployee. Again, if such a presumption is valid, it should apply in negligence as well
as strict liability. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 3, at § 388 comment n.
"32 See FED. R. EVID. 407.
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yester Co. ,3 the California Supreme Court held that the exclusionary rule in regard to post-accident remedial measures did not
apply in a strict liability design case as the plaintiff did not have to
3 The New York
prove negligence or other culpable conduct4.
35
Court of Appeals in Caprarav. Chrysler Corp. likewise has allowed
evidence as to a subsequent change in a manufacturing defect
case. The Capraracourt noted that it was reserving the question
whether subsequent changes in design would be admissible if the
strict liability theory was based upon a "design" defect.3 6 However, in "failure to warn defect" strict liability cases, courts have
recognized that the exclusionary rule should be applied because
the test of liability relates specifically to the defendant's conduct
and is, in fact, a negligence standard. 7
In reviewing the evidence issue in a failure to warn case, the
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit in Werner v. Upjohn. Co.,
Inc.3 considered whether there was a difference between negligence and strict liability failure to warn and concluded:
The elements of both are the same with the exception that in
negligence plaintiff must show a breach of a duty of due care
by defendant while in strict liability plaintiff must show the
product was unreasonably dangerous. The distinction between the two lessens considerably in failure to warn cases
since it is clear that strict liability adds little in warning cases.
Under a negligence theory the issue is whether the defendant
exercised due care in formulating and updating the warning,
while under a strict liability theory the issue is whether the lack
of a proper warning made the product unreasonably dangerous. Though phrased differently the issue under either
theory
39
is essentially the same: was the warning adequate?
The court found no basis for distinction and, therefore, applied the
exclusionary rule.4" The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit has
likewise held that the exclusionary rule is applied in product liability
failure to warn cases, noting that "the basis for liability more closely
33

13 Cal.3d 113, 538 P.2d 1148, 117 Cal. Rptr. 812 (1974) (en banc).

34 Id. at 117-18, 538 P.2d at 1150, 117 Cal. Rptr. at 814.
35 52 N.Y.2d 114, 417 N.E.2d 545, 436 N.Y.S.2d 251 (1981).
36

Id. at 126, 417 N.E.2d at 551, 436 N.Y.S.2d at 257.

37 See, e.g., Oberst v.International Harvester Co., Inc., 640 F.2d 863 (7th Cir.

1980); Werner v. Upjohn Co., Inc., 628 F.2d 848 (4th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449
U.S. 1080 (1981); Bauman v. Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft, 621 F.2d 230
(6th Cir. 1980); Price v. Buckingham Mfg. Co., Inc., 110 N.J. Super. 462, 266 A.2d
140 (App. Div. 1970).
38 628 F.2d 848 (4th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1080 (1981).
39 Id. at 858.
40 See id.

532

SETON HALL LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 17:526

resembles negligence than strict liability." 4 1
Thus, the suggestion that strict liability is required in failure to
warn cases because it will permit the admission of subsequent remedial measures is fallacious and apparently universally rejected.
WARNING AS TO OBVIOUS DANGERS

Manufacturers have been held liable as a result of a strict
liability duty to warn although the danger is obvious.4 2 If public
policy requires such a warning, then that public policy is equally
applicable to both strict liability and negligence. Public policy
does not screech to a halt at the borders of strict liability law, but
has been an integral factor in negligence theory from its inception. Therefore, if this conclusion is impelled by public policy, it
should apply with equal force regardless of the form of action.
The situation is analogous to the issue of punitive damages in
strict liability. The New Jersey Supreme Court had no problem
conceiving that if a public policy exists for punitive damages in
negligent failure to warn, they must also be available in strict liability failure to warn.4 3 Further, in Green v. Sterling Extruder Corp.4 4
that court recognized that if public policy requires that contributory negligence should not be available in a strict liability design
defect case involving machinery guards, then that public policy
also requires that contributory negligence not be available in a
45
negligence action for failure to provide machinery guards.
A

HIGHER DEGREE OF CARE

Some cases have suggested that strict liability sets a more
exacting standard than negligence in regard to failure to warn.
New Jersey cases suggest that the test is whether the product is
"reasonably safe." 4 6 Further, it has been suggested that a product is not reasonably safe "if the same product could have been
' 47
made or marketed more safely.
It is patent that "reasonably safe" requires nothing of a
seller other than reasonable conduct, and that the use of the ad41 Grenada Steel Indus., Inc. v. Alabama Oxygen Co., Inc., 695 F.2d 883, 887
n.3 (5th Cir. 1983).
42 Campos v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 98 N.J. 198, 485 A.2d 305 (1984).

43 Fischer v. Johns-Manville Corp., 103 NJ. 643, 512 A.2d 466 (1986).
44 95 N.J. 263, 471 A.2d 15 (1984).
45 Id. at 271-72, 471 A.2d at 19-20.
46 See Beshada v. Johns-Manville Prod. Corp., 90 N.J. 193, 204, 447 A.2d 539,

546 (1982).
47 See id.
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verb "reasonably" applied to the word "safe" is no different than
its adjectival application to the conduct of the party who provides
the warning. As to the suggestion that a product is defective "if
the same product could have been made or marketed more
safely," that concept has been rejected in subsequent failure to
warn cases. It is a correct statement only if it is read to mean "if
the same product could reasonably have been marketed more
safely." If the actions of the seller are reasonable in selling the
article without a warning or with the warning involved in the case
then, of necessity, the product is "reasonably safe."
FORESEEABILITY

Some courts have suggested that warnings in strict liability
cover "all foreseeable uses" and that this test somehow differs
from the concept of foreseeability involved regarding proximate
cause under negligence theory.4" This view fails to take into account the modern meanings of foreseeability and proximate
cause in negligence. As one treatise has noted, "[f]oreseeability
is not to be measured by what is more probable than not, but
includes whatever is likely enough in the setting of modern life
that a reasonably thoughtful person would take account of it in
guiding practical conduct." 4 9 The concept of foreseeability in
negligence is indeed, as described by that treatise, as "elastic and
capable of expansion, but also ... the particular manner in which
the injury is brought about need not be foreseeable by any
test."' 50 Of necessity, if a use is foreseeable, then injury from
negligent failure to warn is likewise "foreseeable." ' 5' Having
identified the lack of substance in the arguments in favor of creating or preserving an action in strict liability for failure to warn,
this article will examine the confusion for both courts and juries
which accompanies the continuation of strict liability failure to
warn as a cause of action separate from negligent failure to warn.
THE EFFECT OF MISAPPLICATION OF MANUFACTURING

DEFECT

PRINCIPLES TO FAILURE TO WARN CASES

State of the Art
The confused idea of failure to warn as a section 402A "de48 See, e.g., Smith v. United States Gypsum Co., 612 P.2d 251 (Okla. 1980).
49 3 HARPER, JAMES & GRAY, THE LAW OF TORTS 65 (2d ed. 1986).

50 Id. at 69-70.
51 Compare RESTATEMENT, supra note 3, at § 395 comment j (negligence) with
§ 402A comment h (strict liability).
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fect" has led courts down blind alleys, from which they have
eventually had to retreat, sometimes with ill grace. Perhaps the
most embarrassing misadventure of this type was in Beshada v.
Johns-Manville Products Corp. ,52 in which the New Jersey Supreme
Court held that a manufacturer had to warn against "unknowable
dangers." ' 53 The "state of the art" as to knowledge of dangers
was, as a result, held irrelevant.5 4 The opinion was a logical result of the application of section 402A(2) to a failure to warn "defect" case.
Two years later, the Beshada holding was essentially abandoned by the same court in Feldman v. Lederle Laboratories.5 5 The
New Jersey Supreme Court not only effectively overruled Beshada
but rejected the application of subsection (2) of section 402A to
either "design defect" or "failure to warn defect" cases, thereby
restricting it to cases involving "manufacturing" defects. 56 The
court stated:
When the strict liability defect consists of an improper design
or warning, reasonableness of the defendant's conduct is a factor in determining liability .... The question in strict liability
design-defect and warning cases is whether, assuming that the
manufacturer knew of the defect in the product, he acted in a
reasonably prudent manner in marketing the product or in
providing the warnings given. Thus, once the defendant's
knowledge of the defect is imputed, strict liability analysis becomes almost identical to negligence analysis in its focus on
the reasonableness of the defendant's conduct. 5 7
Thus, in failure to warn cases, strict liability has been recognized as
not strict after all. The error derived from an attempt to treat all
"defects"--manufacturing, design, and warning-as homogeneous
90 N.J. 191, 447 A.2d 539 (1982).
For an insightful criticism of Beshada, see Berry, Beshada v. Johns-Manville
Products Corp.: Revolution-or Aberration-in Products Liability Law, 52 FORDHAM L.
52
53

REV.

786 (1984).

Beshada, 90 N.J. at 204-05, 447 A.2d at 546-47.
97 N.J. 429, 479 A.2d 374 (1984).
56 The Feldman decision, however, did not overrule Beshada as to asbestos cases.
See In re Asbestos Litigation Venued in Middlesex County, 99 N.J. 201, 491 A.2d
700 (1984). As to the constitutionality of the distinction, see In re Asbestos Litigation, 628 F. Supp. 774 (D.N.J. 1986), affid, 829 F.2d 1233 (3d Cir. 1987).
57 Feldman, 97 N.J. at 451, 479 A.2d at 385 (citations omitted). The court thus
returned to the realization expressed by the New Jersey Appellate Division in 1979
that "the gist of the cause of action based on an alleged inadequate warning is the
same under both § 388 and § 402A." Torsiello v. Whitehall Laboratories, 165 N.J.
Super. 311, 320 n.2, 398 A.2d 132, 137 n.2 (App. Div.), certif denied, 81 N.J. 50, 404
A.2d 1150 (1979). Cf Higgins v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours, Inc., 671 F. Supp. 1055
(D. Md. 1987).
54

55

1987]

MISCHIEF OF STRICT LIABILITY LABEL

535

and applying the same set of principles and legal fictions to them
equally and without further analysis. There is a significant amount
of other "baggage" that accompanies the strict liability label which,
like section 402A(2), is inappropriate to a failure to warn claim, but
is an expected adjunct to general strict liability theory. As section
402A(2) caused problems for the Beshada court, other strict liability
principles likewise have considerable potential for error if applied to
failure to warn.
Risk- Utility Analysis
In Cepeda v. Cumberland Engineering Co., Inc. ,5 the risk-utility
test was adopted in New Jersey.5 9 Under that test, a product is
defective if the risk, as observed by the jury at the time of trial,
outweighs the benefits of the product. 60 Various factors were
listed for consideration by a judge charged with the responsibility
of determining whether the case should be submitted to ajury.6 1
The court stated that it was not necessary for a jury to find that
the defendant had knowledge of the harmful character of the
product in order to determine that it was not defective.6 2 Further, one of the risk-utility factors ("Wade Factors") for consideration involved "[t]he user's anticipated awareness of the dangers
inherent in the product and their avoidability, because of general
public knowledge of the obvious condition of the product, or of
the existence of suitable warnings or instructions. 6 3 As a result,
the court held an appropriate jury charge would be: liability for a
defect should be imposed if "a [product] . . .is so likely to be
harmful to persons... that a reasonable prudent manufacturer...
who had actual knowledge of its harmful character would not
'6 4
place it on the market."
The risk-utility test is incapable of application to a failure to
warn claim, and its presentation to a jury in such a case can only
lead to utter confusion. The New Jersey Supreme Court has
stated that "where the design defect consists of an inadequate
warning as to safe use, the utility of the product, as counterbal76 N.J. 152, 386 A.2d 816 (1978).
Id. at 174, 386 A.2d at 827.
60 See Suter v. San Angelo Foundry & Mach. Co., 81 N.J. 150, 177, 406 A.2d 140,
153 (1979).
6;I Cepeda, 76 NJ. at 173-74, 386 A.2d at 826-27 (quoting Wade, On the Nature of
Strict Tort Liabilitvfor Products, 44 Miss. L.J. 825, 837-38 (1973)).
(;2 See id. at 174-75, 386 A.2d at 827.
63 Id. at 174, 386 A.2d at 827 (quoting Wade, supra note 61, at 838).
64 See id. (quoting Wade, supra note 61, at 839-40).
58

59
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anced against the risks of its use, is rarely at issue." 6 5 In fact, the
risk-utility test is inapposite and never at issue in judging liability
in a failure to warn case although the presence or absence of a
warning may be a factor in risk-utility analysis.
Not Necessary to Prove "Unreasonably" Dangerous
The New Jersey Supreme Court has rejected the Restatement
definition of defect which includes the concept of "unreasonably
dangerous." Thus, in Freund v. Cellofilm Properties, Inc. ,66 the New
Jersey Supreme Court reversed a lower court decision because a
negligence charge rather than a "strict liability" charge was given
on the issue of failure to warn.6 7 The court based its reversal
upon the fact that "[tlhe terminology employed by the trial judge
was riddled with references to negligence, knowledge and reasonable care on the part of a manufacturer and industry standards, as well as terms of limitation. '"68 If, however, the charge
referred to in Freund is evaluated in the light of the opinion rendered three years later in Feldman, it is found to be an essentially
adequate charge in terms of conduct, which by 1984 was recognized to be at the heart of a failure to warn claim. Thus, an additional danger of the application of a "strict liability label" to a
failure to warn claim is that the judge and jury simultaneously
may be instructed to consider and ignore the reasonableness of
behavior.
Punitive Damages
Although Beshada was essentially overruled by Feldman, it has
remained applicable to asbestos litigation. In Fischer v. JohnsManville Corp., the New Jersey Supreme Court was faced with
the issue of whether punitive damages could apply in an asbestos
strict liability failure to warn case or whether such a claim could
be made only in a negligence failure to warn case. Justice Clifford, writing for the majority, held that punitive damages could
be awarded in a strict liability failure to warn claim, and concluded that, "[t]he right to recover punitive damages cannot sensibly, in this day and age, be made to turn on the form of
65 Freund v. Cellofilm Properties, Inc., 87 N.J. 229, 242, 432 A.2d 925, 932
(1981). Cf Main v. Union Carbide Corp., 219 N.J. Super. 428, 435, 530 A.2d 794,
797 (App. Div. 1987).
66
67
68
9

Id.

See id. at 243, 432 A.2d at 932.
Id.
103 NJ. 643, 512 A.2d 466 (1986).
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pleading .... "70
In Fischer, however, Justice O'Hern filed a dissent in which
Justice Garibaldi joined. Since only five members of the court
participated in the decision, this left the majority with a one vote
plurality. Apparently rejecting the court's prior description of
the strict liability and negligence failure to warn causes of action
as "functional equivalents," Justice O'Hern found "a strong doctrinal inconsistency in permitting a punitive-damages claim in an
action based upon strict products liability." 7 Justice O'Hern further opined that "central to our analysis of strict tort liability is
the premise that it is the condition of the product that determines
liability, not the conduct of the manufacturer. ' 7 2 Further, disregarding the fact that Feldman had conceded that the crux of a failure to warn case is conduct, Justice O'Hern found that in a failure
to warn case "the conduct of the manufacturer is largely irrelevant. '7 Thus, the dissent reemphasized the continued confusion that the strict liability concept has brought to failure to warn
claims. As to asbestos (although perhaps in regard to no other
product), state of the art in regard to knowledge of the seller remains irrelevant, while the Fischer majority insists that punitive
damages are appropriate in an asbestos failure to warn claim.
"

Failure to Warn in IndustrialIngredients
Defendants in failure to warn cases have asserted that they
have adequately warned the person in charge of the use of the
product and could not reasonably be required to warn the plaintiff. In situations in which factory workers are injured due to
their employers' failure to establish safe work practices to protect
them from latent dangers in workplace materials (such as chemical ingredients employed in a manufacturing process), materials
suppliers urge that their failure to communicate warnings to the
factory worker is not negligent or unreasonable conduct.
In cases involving machinery used in the workplace, New
Jersey courts applying strict liability have refused to permit the
machinery designer and manufacturer to deny a duty to include
guards on the grounds that it was the owner's (buyer's) duty to
add guards to the machine.7 ' The rule is well founded in that
70 Id. at 658, 512 A.2d at 474.
71 Id. at 677, 512 A.2d at 484 (O'Hern, J., dissenting).
72

Id. (O'Hern, J., dissenting).

73 Id. at 678, 512 A.2d at 484 (O'Hern, J., dissenting).
74 See, e.g.,.Johnson v. Salem Corp., 97 N.J. 78, 477 A.2d 1246 (1984); Michalko
v. Cooke Color & Chem. Corp., 91 N.J. 386, 451 A.2d 179 (1982); Finnegan v.
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one who sells a dangerous item for use in the workplace is the
most logical individual to design and install the guard which will
avoid injury from such danger.7 5 Furthermore, creating a
guarded machine will effectively keep injury from occurring. The
manufacturer is in the best position to put the guards on the
machine.
Recently, the New Jersey Superior Court, Appellate Division,
in Butler v. PPG Industries, Inc. 76 held that in the workplace setting
a supplier of materials cannot rely upon the employer to take the
appropriate steps to warn and instruct the worker, even if the
employer is bound to do so by law.7 7 The court provided no exposition as to the "public interest" that required such a rule, nor
did it discuss the equities involved. Instead, it cited two New
Jersey "design defect" cases holding that a manufacturer of an
industrial machine cannot rely upon an employer to install safety
devices, such as guards but must install them itself. 78 Butler involved not a machine but a caustic soda supplier.7 9 Mr. Butler, a
plantworker, was unaware that an explosion could result if the
caustic was mixed with hot water or steam.8 0 Butler's employer
was aware of the danger but allegedly failed to instruct Butler in
the use of caustics. 8 ' The inevitable occurred-the employee was
injured by an explosion resulting from the mixture.8 2
Even if the Butler court was correct in its perception of an
overriding "public interest" in regard to the "duty" issue, one
would anticipate the admission of testimony as to the employer's
knowledge of the danger and failure to act on that danger as the
law required him to act on the issue of proximate cause. However, the trial court rejected such evidence and the appellate division affirmed, holding that where "the allegation is that the
purchaser failed to take reasonable steps to protect against the
defect created by the manufacturer, a jury will not be permitted
to infer that the purchaser's negligence was the exclusive proxiHavir Mfg. Co., 60 N.J. 413, 290 A.2d 286 (1972); Bexiga v. Havir Mfg. Co., 60 N.J.
402, 290 A.2d 281 (1972).
75 See id.
76 201 N.J. Super. 558, 493 A.2d 619 (App. Div. 1985).
77 See id. at 563-64, 493 A.2d at 622.
78 Id. at 564, 493 A.2d at 622 (citing Brown v. United States Stove Co., 98 N.J.
155, 484 A.2d 1234 (1984) andJohnson v.Salem Corp., 97 N.J. 78, 477 A.2d 1246
(1984)).
79 Id. at 561, 493 A.2d at 620.
80 See id.
at 562-63, 493 A.2d at 621.
8

See id.
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mate cause of the accident." ' 8 3 The Butler court has taken the
wrong fork in the road in much the same manner as the Beshada
court. By applying principles of strict liability law to a failure to
warn case, the appellate division has effectively eliminated the
main issues in most failure to warn cases; duty to warn and proximate cause, creating not strict, but absolute liability for failure to
warn.
The ability of the seller of an ingredient used in a manufacturing process to warn and instruct its buyer's employees in the
safe use of that ingredient is clearly inferior to the ability of the
employer to do so. As two authors have so cogently described, it
is difficult, if not impossible, for the supplier to identify and reach
the employee-users of the ingredient.8 4 Thus, although the logical party to place guards on a machine is the manufacturer, the
logical party to warn and instruct in the workplace is the employer. By mechanically applying principles appropriate to strict
liability claims to warnings and instructions, the appellate division has created pressure to warn and instruct upon that segment
of industry least capable of effectively warning or instructing the
industrial employee-the ingredient supplier. In doing so, the
courts not only give no incentive to warn to the employer, but
also provide the employer a disincentive to warn; a source from
which the employer can expect reimbursement for the workers
compensation expenses it incurs.8 5 Again, labels of "defect" and
"strict liability" have prevailed over analysis of the facts and policy involved.
CONCLUSION

What is to be gained by continuing to treat failure to warn as
though it involved two causes of action-one for negligence and
another under strict liability? The answer must be that nothing
83 Id. at 564, 493 A.2d at 622. Peculiarly, a New Jersey trial court has subsequently determined that "sophisticated user" evidence is admissible in the employment situation on plaintiff's claim for "negligent failure to warn" but not on his
"strict liability failure to warn" claim. Olencki v. Mead Chem. Co., 209 N.J. Super.

456, 507 A.2d 803 (Law Div. 1986). The court reasoned that in strict liability
"knowledge of the risk that an employer will not warn its employees is not imputed
to a manufacturer." Id. at 463, 507 A.2d at 806. The court found no basis for such
imputation in negligence, although it gave no basis for the differentiation. See id. at
463-64, 507 A.2d at 806-07.
84 Schwartz & Driver, 11'arnings in the Wl'orkplace: The Aeedfor a Synthesis of Law and
Communication Theor v, 52 CIN. L. REv. 38, 42-43 (1983).
85 See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:15-40 (West 1985) (discussing liability of third
parties).
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has been gained other than a triumph of form over substance and
the creation of vast opportunities for confusion. The law of Mar6
tin v. Bengue, Inc. was an effective treatment of failure to warn.8
The intervening thirty years, and the contortions of attempting
to treat negligence as something more esoteric than it is have
done nothing to advance the law of warnings. Strict liability for
failure to warn has served to confuse judges and juries with no
discernible benefits.8 7
The Restatement (Second) of Torts section 402A represented
dramatic liberalization of tort law as to latent defects in a product, imposing liability for a "defect" even if the product was
made with "all possible care." However, the comments to section 402A were themselves defective to the extent that they implied the creation of strict liability for failure to warn. Concepts
of negligence-failure to properly design, failure to warn, failure
to instruct-have unfortunately become intertwined with strict liability. Courts' frequent use of the shibboleths "strict liability,"
"liability without fault," and "defect" in lieu of a careful consideration of the basic policies underlying the issues in a specific
case have led to illogical and sometimes bizarre results. A manufacturing defect is a very different creature from a failure to warn
"defect." The sooner the courts remove "strict liability" from
failure to warn law, the sooner judges and juries will be able to
deal with a sensible and coherent body of law as to negligent failure to properly warn and instruct, without further painful detours into the never-never land of strict liability.
86 See supra note 1.
87 Johnston v. United States, 568 F. Supp. 351, 354 (D. Kan. 1983) ("indeed, it
would be conceptually clearer simply to state that there is no such thing as a 'strict
liability' claim for breach of a duty to warn.").

